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BLUEPRINT FOR INTERNATIONAL TAX
REFORM
David F. Bradford"
I. INTRODUCTION
My object in this paper is to explore a design for a system
of international income taxation that is at once very different
from, and very similar to, the one we have today. The similari-
ty is that it is based on company taxation, just as the present
international rules most centrally concern multinational corpo-
rations. The difference is that the system moves away from the
accrual income objective that, in principle, motivates so much
of the present tax design. As a result, it is possible to exclude
from taxation most financial instruments, and thereby greatly
simplify and rationalize the system. Most readers will recog-
nize the system as based on consumption, rather than income,
although I argue that this distinction hides more of importance
than it reveals.
The paper explicitly is broad-brush in its approach in the
interest of stimulating discussion and reflection. It is intended
to suggest a possible model toward which one might aim that
would deal with a variety of vexing problems in the existing
system, while better serving reasonable ends of that system.
As will be obvious, I make no attempt at systematic citation of
the many works of others from which I have learned about all
of this, or to which I implicitly respond.
In the same spirit, I blithely ignore in this presentation a
host of important practical and political dimensions of the
international tax dilemma. Important examples are interna-
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Wilson School at Princeton University and Adjunct Professor of Law, New York
University. He also currently serves as Research Associate at the National Bureau
of Economic Research in Cambridge, Massacusetts. Professor Bradford is a former
member of the President's Council of Economic Advisors and served as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy). Professor Bradford's research has
centered on public sector economics, and he is particularly noted as an authority
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tional trade conventions (e.g., the GATT) and international
double tax treaties. My intent is to describe a target for re-
form, with no claim to having seriously addressed how to get to
that target. In some cases, I know what I am ignoring. No
doubt, I am missing many others, for which I beg indulgence.
A standard approach to this subject would be to lay out a
set of criteria that the proposed system should Strive to ful-
fill-a set of questions to which the proposed system is the
answer. In the interest of moving briskly to the concrete, and
in view of the great familiarity with the issues on the part of
the present audience, I propose to give the answer and then
work back through some of the important questions.
II. THE X TAX IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETING
I have described in several publications elsewhere what I
call the X Tax, a variant of the Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax.' We
can make do here with a very brief description that neglects
matters such as treatment of governments, charitable contribu-
tions, and the like. The X Tax consists of two components: A
business tax and a compensation tax. Under the business tax,
all businesses (regardless of legal form) are liable for tax at a
single rate on the difference between proceeds from sales and
purchases from other businesses.2 In addition, payments to
workers are deducted. Individuals, except as they also are
businesses, are taxed only under the compensation tax, on
amounts received in payment from businesses. Unlike the
business tax, the compensation tax is levied at graduated
rates, with a zero bracket amount and some set of higher rates
on larger amounts received, up to a top rate that is the same
as the business tax rate. In addition, there would be an earned
income credit, as under the current system.
Importantly for ease of administration, financial transac-
tions are excluded from both business and compensation tax
bases. In the ordinary case, transactions such as borrowing
and lending, issue and repurchase of stock, payments and
receipts of dividends, and the like, do not enter the calculation
of the taxable base. In the helpful terminology of the Meade
1. Other authors have described other variants along similar lines.
2. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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Committee, this is an R-Base ("real" transactions, as opposed
to "financial" transactions) tax.'
The idea would be to adjust these parameters to raise the
needed revenue and achieve the desired degree of progressivity
of the system. This is not the context in which to develop what
might be required to mimic the present system's progressivity.
To have something concrete in mind, however, we could ap-
proximate the progressivity of the current U.S. income tax
system with a rate of business tax of 28 percent, which also
would be the top rate of compensation tax.
It has been understood that, if we neglect the deduction of
payments to workers, the business tax component of this sys-
tem constitutes, in the jargon of the trade, a value-added tax of
the consumption type, implemented by the subtraction method.
This is a great help to thinking about the links among tax
systems in a world of national X Taxes. Provided the rate of
tax is the same, a value-added tax of the subtraction type is
exactly equivalent to a value-added tax of the invoice-and-cred-
it type, a tax institution with which there is a great deal of
experience.
Under the invoice-and-credit method, the selling firm pays
a tax on all sales, noting the amount of tax on the sales in-
voice. A taxable firm making a purchase is allowed a credit
against tax liability of the amount shown on the invoice. The
effect is that a sale from one business to another gives rise to
simultaneous payment of tax by the seller and equal credit
against the tax by the seller. There is no net tax paid to the
government until the point of sale to a buyer other than a
taxable firm, generally the public. The invoice-and-credit meth-
od value-added tax thus gives rise to exactly the same flow of
revenues to the government as does a subtraction-method
value-added tax or a retail sales tax, with the proviso, again,
that the same goods and services are subject to tax at the
same rate.
The fact that the X Tax allows a deduction for payments to
workers (and an earned income credit) does not change funda-
mentally the story from an economic perspective (even though
it may do so from a legal perspective). The system can be un-
3. Financial institutions present special problems, which I neglect in this
paper.
20011 1451
BROOK. J. INTL L.
derstood as a subtraction-method value-added tax, combined
with a system of transfers based on earnings for purposes of
adjusting the vertical distribution of net burdens.
To extend this picture to an international economic sys-
tem, we need to specify the treatment of sales to customers
abroad ("sales to abroad") and purchases from suppliers abroad
("purchases from abroad"). Under most value-added tax sys-
tems, sales to abroad are excluded from the base and purchas-
es from abroad are included in the base. This corresponds to
excluding sales to abroad from the X Tax base and denying a
deduction for purchases from abroad. The result is a destina-
tion-based tax, the idea being that the tax is based on the total
amount of stuff consumed in the country in which it is levied.
Sales destined for another country are excluded from the base
of the exporting country; imports destined for a country are in-
cluded in the importing country's base.
The alternative is to include in the domestic business tax
base sales to abroad and to allow a deduction for purchases
from abroad. The result is an origin-based tax, the idea being
that the tax is levied on the total amount of stuff produced in
the country in which it is levied.
In view of the strong equivalence between these two forms
of tax-they are economically indistinguishable, apart from
transition-it is clear that we must be careful in drawing intu-
itions from the destination- and origin- labels.
The choice between these two rules for treatment of trans-
border sales has important implications; mostly relating to
transitional incidence and incentives, but also relating to
administrability. Indeed, this major element of a fresh design
is one on which the balance of pros and cons is least clear.
Before turning to such relatively technical details, let us
tick off some of the properties of a system based on national X
Taxes, many of which offer solutions to those vexing problems
in the present system.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROPERTIES
A. Financial Transactions Excluded from the Base
A hallmark of the X Tax in a purely domestic setting is its
administrative simplicity. It traditionally has been argued by
many analysts, including myself, that a key property of the
system contributing to its simplicity is its grounding in cash-
1452 [Vol. X=V:4
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flow accounting. In the standard subtraction-method value-
added tax, all that is required to calculate a firm's base is
cash-flow information-sales less purchases from other busi-
nesses. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note I have
concluded that it is preferable to modify this accounting sys-
tem, to provide instead for something like conventional busi-
ness income accounting, supplemented by deduction for the
current cost of capital (an interest rate times business asset
basis). My reasons relate to properties of the system in transi-
tion, which will be referred to again in connection with transi-
tion in the international context. Such a change in the account-
ing rules would cut into the simplicity of the X Tax business
tax base, although not very significantly.
The really major simplifications achieved by the X Tax are
due to the fact that financial transactions are excluded. In the
case of businesses, this means no inclusion of interest or divi-
dends received, no deduction for interest paid, and a host of
similar changes in accounting, eliminating an equally large
host of tax complexities. To mention one prominent problem
that would disappear: No special rules are required for capital
gains. Business assets are taxed on a cash-flow basis (perhaps
as modified per my remarks above); financial assets and liabili-
ties are out of the base.
B. Border Adjustment and Transfer Pricing: A Major Tradeoff
These administrative advantages extend to the interna-
tional version of the system. New administrative problems are
introduced, however, by the border adjustment in the case of
the destination-based system. The exclusion of sales abroad
will call for monitoring methods to assure that the payments
in question really come from foreign purchasers. The disallow-
ance of deduction for purchases from abroad will require moni-
toring the borders, in much the way required by the customs at
present.
This disadvantage is offset by a major plus of a destina-
tion-based tax, its elimination of the transfer-pricing problem.
The need to value purchases and sales among commonly
owned domestic and foreign companies is a perennial problem
in the existing income tax. The problem is magnified greatly by
the ever-growing importance of intangible property in the gen-
eration of profit. Since the proceeds of sales to a foreign cus-
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tomer are not in the destination-based X Tax base, the price
that commonly owned businesses may use to account for the
transaction has no impact on the tax base. The same holds for
an import from abroad. The price does not matter because
there is no deduction anyway.
Under the origin-based system, by contrast, there is no
need to police the borders for imports (apart from customs
requirements). This property becomes especially important
when we take into account, as I shall discuss below, the possi-
bility that consumers may cross borders. I call this "the tour-
ism problem," with the caveat that the term risks distracting
from its policy significance.
The price of dealing with the problem of monitoring the
borders is, however, to bring back the transfer pricing problem.
As mentioned above, the transfer-pricing problem probably is
increasing in importance in a world economy where more and
more value derives from intangible capital.
C. Residence of Firms
The building blocks of an X Tax are business firms. We
can think of it as a tax that consolidates transactions among
some set of companies, with the base consisting of the net
flows from that set of companies. In principle, there is consid-
erable room for choice about the exact definition that places a
company within or without the taxable circle. For present
purposes, however, I imagine rules rather like the ones now
used to determine the liability for domestic corporation or
value-added taxes. Given such conventions, no distinction is
made between domestic and foreign companies. All companies
operating in the United States, for example, are treated alike.
D. Domestic vs. Foreign Source
In the present system, in order to implement the system of
crediting foreign taxes paid, subject to a limit, a distinction is
needed between domestic and foreign-source income. The eco-
nomic concept of income relates to a person, and is not natural-
ly located other than by the location of the person.4 Partly for
4. Traditionally, income has been described as "regardless of source," not
recognizing this emphasis is nonsensical, given the definition as the sum of con-
sumption and change in net worth.
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this reason, there is no fully satisfactory concept of source of
income.
Under the X Tax, at least assuming a non-overlapping
definition of firms subject to tax, there is no place for a foreign
tax credit and no need for any distinction as to geographic
source of a company's tax base.
E. Some Issues That Go Away
In an X-Tax world, repatriation of earnings (a financial
transaction) would have no tax consequences. Deferral would
be a non-issue. Subpart F rules would be unnecessary.5 Issues
of interest allocation, related to the definition of source of in-
come, would be gone. Financial arbitrage among taxable and
tax exempt entities, such as foreign governments, that are
deployed in many tax shelter schemes, would no longer pay off.
I believe the list could be extended greatly by those more
knowledgeable about the current system.
IV. EFFICIENCY PROPERTIES
A. Generic Features of This Type of Tax
This is not the place to go into an extended review of the
efficiency properties of this type of tax. But we may, in pass-
ing, remind ourselves that it is neutral with respect to the
timing of people's consumption. This well-known property of
consumption taxes (with a constant rate over time) often has
been taken (not by me) as the main ground for advocating such
taxes as alternatives to income taxes.
An X Tax provides neutrality with respect to all financial
margins. For example, there is no bias toward or against debt
as opposed to equity finance of companies. There is no lock-in
with respect to positions in financial assets, no bias toward or
against particular assets based on their different patterns of
realization relative to accrual. An X Tax is neutral with re-
spect to all real investment margins (apart from human capital
formation). The tax has no impact on the choice among differ-
ent forms of depreciable capital, inventory investment, and
intangible investment. These neutralities would hold for a
5. An analogue might be called for, however, in connection with the tourism
problem, to which I return below. See infra Part V.B.
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perfect accrual income tax as well, but do not hold for a practi-
cal, realization-accounting tax, even less for a system with a
classical corporation income tax.
An X Tax is non-neutral with respect to labor supply. In
economists' jargon, the tax puts a wedge between the social
payoff to an increment of work effort and the amount received
by the supplier of that effort. Under an X Tax, the wedge
would be zero for a worker within the zero bracket range of the
compensation tax (negative if the worker is eligible for an
earned income credit) and equal to the top rate for a worker in
the top bracket range of the compensation tax. This non-neu-
trality is shared by income taxes.
B. Features Relating to the International Context
1. Neutrality with Respect to Location of Production
Under either treatment of transborder transactions, an X
Tax would be neutral with respect to the location of incremen-
tal real investment of the conventional sort. This is the type of
investment that we usually think of in describing the objec-
tives of capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality.
We imagine an investor in the United States with a break-
even investment opportunity in the United States that yields,
say, ten percent before tax and some, possibly different
amount, after tax. Capital export neutrality holds if the after-
tax return to that investor is the same if it is located abroad.
Capital import neutrality holds if the foreign investor encoun-
ters the corresponding equivalence between investing at home
and in the United States. Because an X Tax does not put any
wedge between the before- and after-tax rates of return at the
margin, at home or abroad, it will satisfy these neutrality
properties.
It may be helpful to have a numerical example. Imagine a
world in which only the United States has a tax and it is at a
rate of 20 percent, expressed on a tax-inclusive basis (so selling
something for $1.25 implies a tax liability of $0.25). Exports
are excluded, from the destination-basis tax base, so competi-
tive forces will tend to push the price of this illustrative good
to $1.00 abroad.6 Similarly, a foreign-produced good that sells
6. I neglect transportation cost.
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for $1.00 abroad will sell for $1.25 in the United States. With
an origin-basis tax, there is no exclusion of the sale to abroad
from the domestic base, so competitive forces will tend to push
the prices at home and abroad to the same level, say $1.00 in
this case.7 A given investment opportunity, defined in terms of
quantities of the good given up in the present and larger quan-
tities of the good obtained in the future, is equally attractive,
regardless of location and regardless of the choice between
destination and origin principles for the tax.
Another important class of investment choices involves the
location at which a new idea is exploited. Suppose a U.S. com-
pany has an idea for a new video game. To keep things simple,
suppose it will cost nothing to produce the thing but duly li-
censed copies will trade freely internationally. Where should
the inventing company have the thing produced? Since it does
not cost anything to produce the good, taxes constitute the only
locational factor.
Suppose an origin basis tax is used. Then copies of the
game will sell for the same price at home and abroad. Specifi-
cally, suppose each copy will sell for $100 and there is a mar-
ket for 5,000 copies abroad and 5,000 copies in the United
States, for a total value of sales of $1 million. With proper
transfer pricing, having the game produced abroad will pro-
duce $1 million in payments from the foreign company for the
rights. This will be treated as a sale by the U.S. X Tax, so the
inventing company's owners net $800,000 from the game, the
same amount they would net if they produced at home and
sold the copies themselves.8
Suppose, instead, that a destination-based tax is used.
Thus, if the price of the game abroad is $100 it 'will sell for
$125 in the United States. Again, the net-of-tax proceeds are
the same, regardless of the location of production. If the thing
is produced at home, the domestic sales net the company
$500,000, as do the foreign sales, for a total of $1 million. It
may appear that the inventor is better off under these arrange-
ments, but that neglects the difference in U.S. price levels in
the two examples, it being 25% higher in the second case. The
7. The absolute price level is indeterminate in this little story.
8. If, on the other hand, the royalties can be understated, there will be a
payoff to location of production abroad.
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purchasing power of what the inventor nets is the same in
both examples.
2. Neutrality with Respect to Location of Consumption?
I have mentioned the "tourism problem." This is my jargon
for the incentive, under a destination-basis tax, to shop in the
country with the lowest tax rate. If the boundaries can be
monitored, this incentive is eliminated except to the extent
that both the shopping and the consumption are done in the
low-tax country. Hence, my term for the problem.
We can add this phenomenon to any of our illustrations
above. Suppose our conventional good is produced by labor
alone. The worker gets $1.00 and the producer breaks even by
selling the good for $1.25 and paying $0.25 in tax. In terms of
this good, the worker's earnings on this deal at home are only
0.8; that is, he or she can buy just 0.8 units of the good with
the wages earned in producing it. On the other hand, the
worker who goes abroad with the wages earned can buy 1 unit
of the good. This is the tourism problem. The country with the
destination value added tax (VAT) penalizes visiting tourists
and rewards its own citizens who shop abroad. (Note the im-
portance in this example of the U.S. tax rate being higher than
that abroad.)
The tourism problem is encountered in tle U.S. tax system
currently in the form of debates over an "expatriation tax."
Because the U.S. system has substantial elements of accrual
accounting and because changing citizenship is a much bigger
deal than changing location of residence, the extent of the
tourism problem is probably very much lower under present
U.S. law than it would be under a destination-principle X Tax.
Not only would the dot-coin-generation inventors of our illus-
trative game have a significant incentive to migrate to a low-
tax jurisdiction; ordinary people with ordinary retirement in-
comes' might find it worth while as well.
V. EQUITY ISSUES
A. Generic Features of This Type of Tax
As indicated above, my view is that an X Tax is amenable
to a wide range of degrees of progressivity. Since, as a matter
of adminstrability, the top rate of compensation tax is limited
[Vol. XXVI:4
BLUEPRNT FOR TAX REFORM
to the rate of business tax, and it is probably desirable, also as
a matter of enforcement, not to have too high a rate of busi-
ness tax, one might argue that the existing system is capable
of imposing a heavier burden at the very high reaches of the
income distribution. On the other hand, the fact that we have
in the past had company tax rates in the neighborhood of 50%,
suggests a range of possible policies that is not usually associ-
ated with the flat tax.
It probably will be objected that there is something inher-
ently regressive about using a consumption, rather than an
income, measure as the basis for discriminating among taxpay-
ers. How can a tax system that exempts "income from capital"
be as progressive as one that taxes income from capital? I will
not rehearse the arguments that, starting from first principles
(that is, not taking income as the right measure of ability to
pay as a matter of definition), one is quite likely to conclude
that excluding income from capital is plausibly appealing in its
own right. Rather, I emphasize my view that there is a general
misperception of what income from capital is. Most of what we
regard as business income (for example, those fortunes accu-
mulated by the dot-comers) would be subjected to tax by an X
Tax. (Consider the tax levied on those copies of the games.)
The realization slowly is spreading among those of us who
think about tax policy (it dawned on me rather late in my
career), that the difference between a well-designed income tax
and just about any old consumption type tax is entirely in the
taxation of the risk-free return to wealth. I argue that this
does not amount to much in the context of the debate about
the choice between systems. The other payoffs are taxed equal-
ly or missed by both types of tax.
B. Specific Features of the International Version
I think the main equity issue raised by a possible X Tax
world relates to concerns about equity among nations. I always
have been uneasy with the notion that nations, as opposed to
individual people, have tax equity claims. It may be, however,
that there is a correlation between national welfare and the
circumstances of residents of different countries that would
unify the two perspectives. Rather than tackle this question,
let us consider the implications for an X Tax regime of the
traditional viewpoint that there is an ethical claim by a coun-
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try to revenue associated with income produced within its
boundaries (with, to be sure, a residual claim by the country of
residence of the owner of that income).
It would seem to me-and I confess to be unsure whether
this captures the right idea-that an origin-based X Tax would
satisfy the demands of the traditional view. Basically, all busi-
ness "income," as defined by the X Tax rules, would be subject
to tax in the origin country. That the income so defined ex-
cludes what amounts to the risk-free rate of return times the
wealth tied up in the enterprise seems to me a minor matter
quantitatively. I recognize that others may disagree with the
quantitative assessment, which ought to be a valid subject of
analysis and discussion.
If, however, the basic premise is accepted for purposes of
discussion, the further conclusion follows from the economic
equivalence of an origin- and destination-based X Tax that the
latter equally satisfies the demands of international equity. In
that case, a choice between them could be made on administra-
tive grounds. Important among those administrative issues
would be the "tourism problem." If my illustrative inventor can
locate its production in a country and its owners do their con-
sumption abroad, they will avoid the tax unless a device can be
developed to prevent it.
Another important set of administrative issues is raised by
transition, to which I very briefly turn.
VI. TRANSITION
A. Generic Features of This Type of Tax
Transition to a consumption type tax, such as an X Tax,
from an income type tax with current accrual accounting, such
as the existing system, raises significant issues of incidence
and efficiency. Most of those engaged in tax policy debates are
familiar with the major point: Shifting from accrual to pure
cash-flow accounting imposes a one-time tax on existing basis.
Whether this is "fair" or not is debatable. It certainly presents
significant incentive problems, since taxpayers can mitigate
the burden of the transition impact, perhaps significantly, by
increasing consumption in anticipation of the change in re-
gimes. On both equity (accepting the premise that it is unfair
to hit taxpayers with such a transition burden) and efficiency
grounds, I concluded it probably would be attractive to adopt
1460 [Vol. XX=:4
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the income style accounting for business activity that I briefly
described above.
B. Specific Features of the International Version
The choice between origin- and destination- bases for an X
Tax regime raises similar problems. We can get a feel for the
issues by imagining what would be involved in making a
switch from an origin- to a destination-basis tax.
If we think about the transactions involved we can see
that the difference between a value-added tax with border
adjustment, and one without, is to be found in the current
taxation of net exports.9 One way of elaborating on this point
is to trace through the way a shift in the exchange rate be-
tween the home and foreign country currencies can assure
precisely the same results under either system. Another way is
to assume that the exchange rate is fixed (as it is, for example,
between states in the United States, all of which use dollars).
Then, the alternatives give rise to different price levels.
Another numerical illustration is perhaps worth the extra
words as the route to understanding how things work out.
Consider two countries with exactly balanced trade. Computers
are produced in the first country, say the United States, a total
output of ten million units, selling for $1000 each, for a total
output value of $10 billion. One million of the computers are
sold to France, for a total export value of $1 billion, in ex-
change for one billion bottles of spring water at $1 each. The
United States has a 25 percent value-added tax of the con-
sumption type, with no adjustment at the border. Computers
are built entirely from labor services, so that the tax paid on
the computers is $2.5 billion and the workers are paid $7.5
billion. The import of $1 billion gives rise to a deduction of $1
billion and the resale to U.S. customers to an inclusion of $1
billion for no net tax. In France there is no tax; the $1 billion
paid for the spring water is paid in turn to French workers,
who spend a total of $1 billion for the computers.
To foster exports, the United States announces a switch to
a system of rebating tax at the border, and charging tax on
imports, giving effect to the new policy by allowing firms to
exclude the export sales from their tax calculations, while
9. I say "current" because the issue is one of timing.
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disallowing the deduction of the cost of the bottled water to the
importer.
Without any change in prices, the new situation cannot be
in equilibrium. Exporting from the United States to France is
highly profitable, while the U.S. importer suffers losses. Anoth-
er set of prices will, however, restore balance. For example, as
a result of a general decline in the price level in France, the
price of a bottle of water drops to $0.75. The price of computers
in France also drops, to $750. Nominal wages drop accordingly,
so there is no change in real wages. Therefore, the French
water company still is happy to supply the original quantity of
water, the demand for which in the United States is un-
changed, because $0.25 in tax is now added to the price. The
U.S. computer maker is happy to accept the $750 offered by
the French, even though computers still sell for $1000 in the
United States, since there is a $250 tax saving upon export.
The U.S. Treasury still collects $2.5 billion in tax; U.S. workers
still get $7.5 billion in earnings that they still can spend on
computers and bottled water at the original terms.
What has changed? The price level in France. With flexible
exchange rates, things are even easier. Then, a simple ex-
change rate change, following the shift in policy, will restore
the conditions of equilibrium, with no change in amounts pro-
duced or exchanged, no change in real wages, and no change in
the effective price of the goods to their purchasers (workers
and governments).
The same argument succeeds when the status quo ante is
a situation of unbalanced current trade, in either direction.
I looked at a change from an origin- to a destination-
based tax advisedly. If the existing system reasonably is ap-
proximated by accrual income taxation, then I speculate that
adopting an origin-based X Tax would have relatively small
incidence and allocation effects of the sort described above.
Adoption of a destination-based X Tax would be like a shift
from an origin-based to a destination-based tax. Since there
are often transition rules that can neutralize effects of the sort
involved here, clearly, the subject would merit a more careful
study were the X Tax option to be taken seriously. But my
preliminary conclusion is that adopting an origin-based system
would generate much smaller transition effects than would
adopting a destination-based system.
[Vol. XXVI:41462
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VII. CONCLUSION
I conclude from this exercise that a general regime of na-
tional X Taxes offers major advantages over the existing sys-
tem, cutting through a number of policy knots, producing re-
sults that are attractive from domestic and international equi-
ty points of view, and having remarkable neutrality properties
in the service of efficiency. Of the two major variants, destina-
tion-based and origin-based, it appears that the origin-based
approach is likely to present the preferred balance of virtues
and vices, although a great deal of attention to design options
would be called for to reach a conclusion on this design detail.

